

CONFIDENTIAL

Executive Summary

80-3179

24 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
23 January 1980 []

1. Dr. Brzezinski asked for a short paper on Baluchistan. He would like to know things like the number of people, the different groupings, the probability of movement in one direction or the other, etc. We could do it as a PDB Annex, but I'm inclined to think we may want to have it just a bit longer than that and with a few more illustrations. I believe the Baluchistan Primer may suffice for this, and I will send a copy to him. []

2. I asked him about the contingencies list and papers. He had not yet read it. The list apparently was produced by [] Dr. Brzezinski didn't seem too concerned with it. []

3. I asked him what he thought the Soviets were up to with Sakharov. He felt it was an innate response to pressure from the outside--pull together and make sure everybody is united. Hence they needed to quiet Sakharov and put forward a united front to the rest of the world. []


4. I discussed yesterday's meetings on charters. He said he was aware of them. I pointed out we had not yet had an SCC meeting, let alone a meeting with Chairmen Boland and Bayh and others on the letters the President received about covert action findings. I said that Cutler had asked us now to write a reply; I needed copies of the letters. He said fine but he didn't know who had them. He thought Cutler or Gregg had them. I told him Cutler had not been able to give them to us but I thought that might be because he didn't feel he had the authority to do so. I would now reapproach Cutler and tell him that Brzezinski had given authority or approach Gregg to see if he had them. (Passed by telecon to Fred Hitz who will take action.) []

3 separate memos
filed "DC, Executive Summary"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. I did not get time to raise APEX.



STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

CONFIDENTIAL